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FOREWARD
SYMPOSIUM: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Donald G. Hagman*
It is not clear how one is selected to write forewards. Expertise no doubt helps, but I eschew being an expert. However,
as I explained recently in response to a semi-drunk member of
the audience who was berating experts in the question-andanswer epilogue to my speech, I sometimes admit to being a
specialist. That admission resulted in receipt of a small book
from the chair' of the program at which I was speaking. The
short story started as follows:
You've heerd a lot of pratin' and prattlin' about this
bein' the age of specialization. I'm a carpenter by trade. At
one time I could of built a house, barn, church or chicken
coop. But I seen the need of a specialist in my line, so I
studied her. I got her; she's mine. Gentlemen, you are face
to face with the champion privy builder of Sangamon
County.'
From here on I'll eschew being even a specialist. Whether
qualified to comment or not, I do commend the editors of the
Santa ClaraLaw Review for assembling this excellent symposium on environmental law. Both species of the environmental
genus are covered: pollution law and environmental impact
statutes. The articles span the geography: one deals largely
with the San Francisco area, two with California, and two with
matters of state and national concern. I will introduce them in
that up-from-the-bottom order.
As Chair of the Tactics and Strategies Committee of the
Advisory Council of the South Coast Air Quality Management
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District (SCAQMD),3 I read Thomas Crawford's article, The
Bay Area Air Quality Management District:Air Pollution Control at the Local Level,4 with anticipation. I wondered if I had
been correct in my earlier despondency that local governments
would do nothing to improve air quality.' Mr. Crawford's article is not about "local" as in city or county; it is about
"regional" as in the nine-county Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD). Nevertheless, the BAAQMD and
the SCAQMD are sister districts that have much more in common than their unimaginative acronyms, so it was with interest
that I read how regional air pollution controls are enforced in
the San Francisco area.
While both districts use a variety of enforcement mechanisms, the BAAQMD relies extensively on civil penalties. State
statutes require proof that the pollution violation was intentional or negligent before penalites can be collected. The
SCAQMD relies more on misdemeanor criminal actions for
which there is strict liability under the statute - violate the
pollution law and go to jail (or at least pay a criminal penalty).
Only in the last few months has the SCAQMD sought civil
fines. This difference is of particular interest for further empirical investigation of enforcement efficacy: several comments are
in order.
First, it is curious that the criminal penalty is easier to
obtain than the civil penalty. Second, since BAAQMD assessed
$431,000 of civil penalties in the two-year period of 1977-1978,1
one wonders whether BAAQMD has found a good means to
finance its post-Proposition 13 operations. Third, in observing
that from twenty-one to one hundred twenty-eight violations
were civilly-fined against each of eight corporations, one wonders if the BAAQMD is selling the right to pollute and calling
it a civil fine. If so, the statutory maximum of $500 per violation must be a below-market price since the demand is quite
high.
Other statistics are of interest. For example, Mr. Crawford
reports that the BAAQMD has forty-four trained inspectors
3. This position is inversely powerful to the length of the title.
4. Crawford, The Bay Area Air Quality Management District:Air PollutionControl at the Local Level, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 619 (1979).
5. Hagman, Why the Local Government Portion of the AQMP Will Be Inadequate and What to Do About It, Airogram, Aug., 1978, at 5.
6. Crawford, supra note 4, at 624.
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and five field engineers engaged in the enforcement effort. 7 Yet
it has thirty-five polluters emitting 500 or more tons of any
pollutant per year and forty-seven polluters emitting 100-499
tons.' In the Los Angeles area, the SCAQMD has eighty inspectors whose work generated civil fines of $13,000 for the eight
months ending February 1, 1979. In the same period, $57,500
in criminal penalties were paid. There are more big polluters
in the SCAQMD, but the data are not directly comparable.'
Repeated violators are subject to sanctions designed to end the
pollution, such as revocation of permits rather than to sanctions that seem to be selling the right to pollute.
One does not know from Mr. Crawford's article how much
it costs the BAAQMD to maintain an enforcement officer, but
$30,000 per year would be a reasonable guess. The BAAQMD
appears to be collecting about $200 per violation ($30,000 X 49
officers X 2 years = $2,940,000 expenditure to collect $430,000
in fines)." The price is right from the polluters' viewpoint, but
it is hardly an effective way to support the District. A maximum civil penalty of $5,000 - tenfold its current limits - is
clearly justified either on the basis that the BAAQMD is selling
pollution rights or on the basis that violators should be charged
the costs of enforcement."
The SCAQMD, on the other hand, cannot be looking to
fines to support its operation since the criminal penalties go to
other governments. In addition, the budget of the SCAQMD
comes primarily from permits and emission fees, and it may be
regarded as unfair that the law-abiding rather than the violating polluters pay the cost of enforcement.
"As enacted into law on September 17, 1970 . . . [the
California Environmental Quality Act] CEQA was rather simple and uncomplicated."' 2 Indeed, it was largely regarded as a
paper tiger by the governmental agencies whose public works
projects were thought by many to be the sole addressees of the
7. Id. at 620.
8. Id.at 621-22.
9. The SCAQMD keeps statistics by pollutant. There are, for example, 37
sources of 500 or more tons of hydrocarbons and 18 emitting 100-499 tons of hydrocarbons. These statistics were provided by Arthur Segal, Director of Enforcement,
SCAQMD, and George Thomas, Supervising Air Pollution Engineer II, SCAQMD.
10. Calculated from Crawford, supra note 4, at 624.
11. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Dev., The Polluter Pays
Principle (1975).
12. Hagman, NEPA 'sProgeny Inhabit the States - Were the Genes Defective?,
7 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1974).
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Act. The measure had so little bite that it was not even
amended in 1971, although almost all major legislation needs
a "clean-up" bill.' 3 In fact, the two-year period through September 21, 1972, might better be thought of as a period of
gestation. The CEQA was really "born" on the day that the
California Supreme Court decided Friends of Mammoth v.
Board of Supervisors of Mono County.' 4 The court "legislated"
that the Act applied to publicly-permitted private sector projects and served notice that it would not be outdone by any
other branch of government in the environmental absolutism
sweepstakes. 5 Less than two months later, the people passed
the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 by initiative.'6 The second half of 1972 was clearly vintage environmentalism.
In retrospect, late 1972 also turned out to be an apogee.
Once its regulatory scope was defined in Friendsof Mammoth,
the CEQA has been amended every year, including the year of
judicial midwifery. 7 The CEQA is approaching the complication of the Internal Revenue Code. A road map to it is necessary. This symposium fortunately contains an excellent description in Selina Bendix's A Short Introduction to the California Environmental Quality Act. 1sCombining sage advice
with orderly, succinct, and accurate summaries of the CEQA
and its guidelines, Bendix's contribution is useful reading for
all but the most experienced practitioners.
Despite the Bendixes of the world, the state's legislative
processes spun an environmentally-oriented regulatory web,
and many administrators were unable to comply and still produce their development permissions within a reasonable period
13. The term "clean-up" is a euphemism used in California for "we goofed."
14. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1040, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
15. In a forthcoming study, DiMento, Dozier, Emmons, Hagman, Kim,
Greenfield-Sanders, Waldau & Woollacott, Land Development and Environmental
Law in the California Supreme Court: For(e)wa(o)rd for the 1980's(.)?, the Friends of
Mammoth decision is the top-ranked land developmental control decision of the California Supreme Court in the 1967-1977 era.
16. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (Deering 1976) (repealed by id. § 27650)
(replaced by California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PuB. Rs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West
1977 & Supp. 1979)).
17. 1972 Cal. Stats. chs. 971, 1154; 1973 Cal. Stats. ch. 895; 1974 Cal. Stats. chs.
56, 176, 276; 1975 Cal. Stats. chs. 222, 242, 1187; 1976 Cal. Stats. chs. 593, 753, 1312;
1977 Cal. Stats. chs. 854, 1045, 1200; 1978 Cal. Stats. chs. 308, 356, 760, 791, 1075, 1093,
1113, 1271.
18. Bendix, A Short Introduction to the California Environmental Quality Act,
19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 521 (1979).
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of time. That in turn led to much carping by developers whose
problems were dramatized by the 1977 decision of Dow Chemical Company to cancel its multi-million dollar petrochemical
plant in Northern California. In 1979, allegedly for similar reasons, Sohio cancelled its multi-million dollar Alaskan oil transfer facility in Southern California." Rather than repeal things
such as the CEQA and integrate its concepts into a comprehensive, regional, environmentally-conscious land development
control system,20 the Governor and the Legislature responded
to the carping and the Dow incident by further regulation.
That regulation took the form of time limits imposed on
completing work under the CEQA and on issuing development
permits. The time limits on development permits were imposed by the development project law." Rather than putting
environmental legislation in order, these laws in effect ordered
the administrators to work faster. As Barbara Sahm explains
in fascinating commentary in Project Approval Under the Environmental Quality Act: It Always Takes Longer Than You
Think,22 the time limits may result in poorer decision-making,
slower decision-making, and a host of other counter-productive
situations.
Ms. Sahm and Ms. Bendix must be a dynamic duo. Resistant to the charms of San Francisco, they spend their off-duty
hours from the City and County of San Francisco to write law
review articles. The reader inclined to psychological profiling
can infer from these manuscripts that both women are hard
workers, doing their best to comply with the state edicts concerning development cgntrol. They're environmentalists, not
property-rightists. They'd like to do their jobs right. One can
hope that the legislators are listening to those folks down there
in the trenches. I'm glad to confess that my empathy for the
likes of Ms. Bendix and Ms. Sahm is vicarious. It's far easier
to study, teach, and write about regulatory nonsense than to
have to administer a nonsensical system.
The opportunity to read things that might otherwise not
19. W.B. Rood, Legislative Leaders Balk at Terms Sought by Sohio, L.A. Times,
Mar. 27, 1979, pt. 1, at 3, col. 2.
20. See Hagman, supra note 12, at 45-51; see also Hagman, Life After Jarvis:
How to End "Cordimeetparalysis"and Reorganize Local Government, 9 CAL. J. 336
(1978).

21. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65950-65957.1 (West Supp. Pamph. 1966-1978).
22. Sahm, Project Approval Under the California Environmental Quality Act:
It Always Takes Longer Than You Think, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 579 (1979).
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come to one's attention is a major reward of writing a symposium foreward. There are so many rooms in the environmental
mansion these days that to classify oneself as an environmental
lawyer means only that one is more likely than not able to
communicate with like-classified persons. That was my reaction to the DuBey and Fidell article, The Assessment of Pollution Damage to Aquatic Resources: Alternatives to the Trial
Model.2" While I know little about the subject, I expect those
more knowledgeable will find their article thoughtful and imaginative. It describes the existing state of the art, derived
largely from the fact that oil spills and piscatorial interests do
not mix. The article generalizes from that fact to the issues of
what damages flowing from environmental degradation should
be counted, how valuation problems are to be solved, and how
the process should be administered efficiently and equitably.
The topic is an important one. If we are to soberly understand the damage to public and natural resources such as air,
water, marshlands, biotic communities, and ecosystems without strident, emotive combat between producer-polluters and
environmentalists, the rule of law must somehow be able to
provide, measure, and administer a damages system. The alternatives are to scream at each other in the dark, to impose
such high administrative costs that putting a proper price on
the environment is not worth the candle, or to enjoin activities
entirely and accept the resultant inefficiencies simply because
there is no currency of exchange that society can use to value
the environment. By their own admission, DuBey and Fidell do
not answer all the questions, but their article substantially cuts
the distance to the horizon.
Zan Henson and Ken Gray have written Injunction Bond4
ing in Environmental Litigation for this symposium. Their
thesis is that plaintiffs in environmental litigation should not
be required to provide bonds as a condition for obtaining preliminary injunctions. Theirs is a very effective piece of advocacy, 25 but reaction to it may well depend on the degree to
which one regards environmental plaintiffs as knights in altruistic shining armor. Preservers of the status quo, in my opinion, are not always entitled to a presumption that they are
23. DuBey & Fidell, The Assessment of Pollution Damage to Aquatic Resources:
Alternatives to the Trial Model, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 641 (1979).
24. Henson & Gray, Injunction Bonding in Environmental Litigation, 19 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 541 (1979).
25. I don't mean to disparage advocacy, merely to identify it.
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acting in the public good. There are many self-seekers among
plaintiffs in environmental lawsuits, and some of them are also
elitists, excluders, or owners of existing shopping centers who
don't want the new competition. Even if truly altruistic, it is
not clear that altruists should be entitled to different rules on
bonds in preliminary injunction cases than anyone else. Sympathy for litigants who prevent change may depend on whether
the status is anything to quo about. For example, the Pacific
Legal Foundation, a public interest law firm which defends
capitalism, has brought a number of successful environmental
lawsuits in recent years to prevent imposition of regulations
designed to enhance the environment. Since it wasn't clear in
their draft, I asked Henson and Gray to conduct a selfexamination of their thesis by assuming that ninety-five percent of environmental lawsuits were brought by Pacific Legal
Foundation-type plaintiffs rather than by "white hat" type
environmentalists. Would their enthusiasm for eliminating
bonds in environmental litigation still hold? They tell me it
does. Thus, uninformed readers such as myself can have confidence that Henson and Gray are as correct in their conclusions as they are effective in their advocacy.
The five pieces in this symposium are rich in variety, ranging from policy to advocacy, from theory to practicuum. They
reflect the richness and diversity of this complex subject called
environmental law. Considerable material about the subject
has already been published, but this symposium demonstrates
there's always room for more good articles.

